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Abstract 
 In this study, the understanding of biased social cognition was investigated in 4-and 6-year old children. Children were assessed 
by the deceptive-box task and four stories that each of them had three characters: one actor and two observers. At the end of each 
story, children were asked to infer the observers’ interpretations of the actor’s ambiguous action. The results revealed that at the 
age of 6 years, children understood that prior beliefs (biases) influenced the observer’s interpretation of another individual’s 
behaviour. This understanding was more difficult than the recognition of false belief. 
© 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved 
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1. Introduction 
Past researches about children's theory of mind have mainly focused on preschoolers' ability to understand the 
possibility of false beliefs. This narrow focus has been criticized by some researchers (Carpendale & Chandler, 
1996). According to Lalonde and Chandler (2002), children's theory of mind develops in two stages. At the first 
stage, which emerges between 3 and 5 years of age, children have an empiricist theory of mind, therefore, they can 
pass false- belief tasks with the use of a "seeing = knowing" rule. At the second stage, which emerges around the 
age of 6 years old, children begin to understand that knowledge and beliefs may originate through cognitive 
activities such as interpretation. In other words, children understand "interpretive" character of the mental life. 
According to Amsel and Smally (2000), interpretational understanding of the mind needs more complex level of 
“counterfactual reasoning about possibilities." They claimed that children initially can reason about possible states 
of affairs (e.g., “What would have happened if things were different?”), then, gradually, children acquire the ability 
to evaluate an actual state of affairs in light of different possible ones. This ability enables children to understand 
that the same actual state of affairs is interpreted differently by different people. In other words, children acquire an 
interpretive theory of mind. Understanding biased social cognition is an important aspect of interpretive theory of 
mind. Pillow, (1991) and Pillow and Weed (1995) investigated about this understanding. In his investigations, 
children were asked to infer the perspective of an observer whose prior belief towards one actor would likely bias 
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his or her interpretation of the actor’s ambiguous action. Pillow found that between 6 and 8 years of age, children 
acquired the ability to infer the observer's interpretation of another person's behaviour. Although this ability 
improves children’s social interactions, a few studies (especially cross-cultural ones) have paid attention to it. 
Therefore, in the present study, we examine the understanding of biased social cognition in a sample of Iranian 
preschoolers. We also compare this understanding with preschoolers’ ability to recognize possibility of false belief. 
 
2. Method 
2.1. Subjects 
Sixteen 4-year-olds (8 girls and 8 boys, mean age 4 years, 4 months) and sixteen 6-year-olds (8 girls and 8 boys, 
mean age 6 years and 2 months) participated in this study. The children were students at a preschool affiliated to 
Tehran University. 
 
2.2. Procedure 
Each subject was assessed in two separate sessions. To assess each subject, we used the deceptive box task in the 
first session and we applied four narrative situations in the second session. 
 
2.2.1. The deceptive box task 
This task was designed by Hogrefe, Wimmer and Perner (1986). In this task the experimenter showed a smarties 
box to each subject and she asked "What do you think is in this box?" After child responded, the experimenter 
showed that the box's content was a pen. Then the experimenter asked "If we show this box to your best friend, what 
will she or he think is in this box?" The correct answer was "pen."  
 
2.2.2. The narrative situation 
2.2.2.1. Description the task 
This task consisted of four stories. These stories were designed by pillow (1991) and each of them was 
accompanied by four or five illustrations. In each story one character- the actor- performed an action that could be 
interpreted in two ways. The perspectives of the other two characters- the observers- differed in one of two ways. In 
two stories (contrasting biases stories); the observers held contrasting biases concerning the actor, but both lacked 
the information needed to disambiguate the actor’s action. In the other two stories (contrasting knowledge stories), 
the observers shared the same bias, but one observer was privy to information that made the actor’s intention 
obvious, but the other was not (the stories are presented in the appendix). Each child heard the four stories, with the 
order of story types counterbalanced across the children. At the end of each story the children were probed for recall 
of each observer’s bias or observer’s knowledge of the disambiguating information. If the children did not answer 
correctly, the experimenter reviewed the story and asked the probe questions again. Then the children were asked 
the following test questions: (1) the observer’s interpretation questions for example, “What does Marjan think Sarah 
is doing?” and (2) justification questions for example, “Why does Marjan think that?” 
 
2.2.2.2. Classification of responses 
The children's responses to “the observer's interpretation questions” were coded into three categories: (a) positive 
interpretation, referring to the observer’s belief that the actor’s behaviour was prosocial such as donation; (b) 
negative interpretation, referring to the observer’s belief that the actor’s behaviour was antisocial such as theft; (c) 
description, recounting the story events without referring to observers' interpretations of the actor's action. Then the 
children’s responses were rescored by another rater (Cohen's kappa = 0.83). Also the children's responses to 
“justification questions” were coded into three categories: (a) referring to the observer's bias towards the actor; (b) 
referring to the observer's ability or inability to see a disambiguating event; (c) "other" (e.g., "Sarah wants to be a 
good and helpful girl"). The children's responses to “justification questions” were reliably rated by two independent 
judges (Cohen's kappa = 0.78). 
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2.2.2.3. Scoring contrasting biases stories 
Children would have passed each story (each trial) if they had attributed a negative interpretation to the 
negatively biased observer and a positive interpretation to positively biased observer, then they had justified their 
responses by referring to the observers' biases towards the actor. 
 
2.2.2.4. Scoring contrasting knowledge stories  
Children would have passed each story (each trial) if they had attributed the knowledge of disambiguating 
information to the informed character and they had attributed negative interpretation (in story 3) or positive 
interpretation (in story 4) to the uniformed character; then they had justified the difference between the observers’ 
beliefs by referring to the observers’ ability or inability to see disambiguating event. 
 
2.2.2.5. The experimenter’s guidance 
In each story, when the children failed for the first time, the experimenter guided them. The experimenter 
highlighted the two possible interpretations of actor's action and she highlighted the difference between the 
observers' biases (in story 1 and 2) or the difference between the observers’ knowledge (in story 3 and 4). After 
highlighting these, the experimenter asked the test questions again.  
3. Results 
3.1. The deceptive box task  
As it is shown in Table 1, ten of the 4-year-olds (62.5%) and fourteen of the 6-year-olds (87.5%) passed the 
deceptive box task. Thus, the difference between the two age groups was not significant (Yates's corrected χ2 = 1.5, 
df = 1, p = 0.221). 
 
Table 1. Number of children that passing and failing on deceptive box task by age 
 
 Performance on deceptive box task  
Age  Failed Passed 
4 years  6 10 
6 years  2 14 
Note. There were 16 children of each age. 
3.2. The narrative situations 
Results for these situations are offered in the following four sections: 
3.2.1. The contrasting bias stories 
Result for the contrasting bias stories are presented in Table 2. These results show that only one 4-year-olds gave 
appropriate response on one trial (on the second trial, after she received guidance). In addition, these result show 
that among 6-year-olds four children provided appropriate responses on both trials and five subjects answered 
correctly on only one trial (on the second trial, after they received guidance). So in this age group, nine children 
passed at least one trial. Thus, the statistical comparison between two age groups revealed that although the number 
of children who gave appropriate responses on both trials did not differ significantly by age (Yates's corrected χ2 = 
2.57, df = 1, p = 0.109), the number of subjects who correctly answered on at least one trial increased significantly 
with age (Yates's corrected χ2 = 7.12, df = 1, p = 0.008). Because both the experimenter's guidance and the repeat of 
trial improved the 6-year-olds children's performance, so they performed significantly better than the 4-year-olds. 
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Table 2. Number of children giving correct responses on 0,1,2 trials by age and story type 
 
                                            Story type 
 Contrasting bias               Contrasting knowledge      
Age  0 trials 1 trial 2 trials 0 trials 1 trials 2 trials 
4 years 15 1 - 13 2 1 
6 years 7 5 4 3 5 8 
Note. There were 16 children of each age. 
 
3.2.2. The contrasting knowledge stories 
Results for the contrasting knowledge stories are also presented in Table 2. These result show that only one 4-
year-olds gave correct answers on both trials, whereas eight 6-year-olds provided appropriate responses on both 
trials. Thus, significantly more 6-year- olds than 4- year- olds gave appropriate responses on both trials (Yates's 
corrected χ2 = 5.56, df = 1, p = 0.018). 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
3.2.3. The comparison between the two types story 
Since a few number of 4-year-olds were successful on the narrative situations, in this age group, the difference 
between the two types of story was not significant (the statistical comparison was not possible). In addition, among 
6- year- olds, eight subjects were successful on both contrasting knowledge stories and only four of them were 
successful on both contrasting bias stories. Thus, the 6-year-old children's performance differed significantly across 
the two types of story (Cochran’s = 5.33, df = 1, p = 0.021). Also, 6-year-old children passed 53% of contrasting 
knowledge stories and 25% of contrasting bias stories without receiving the experimenter's guidance. 
Moreover, in total sample, nine subjects gave appropriate responses on both contrasting knowledge stories, 
whereas only four subjects were successful on both contrasting bias stories. Thus, there was a significant difference 
between the two types of story (Cochran's = 11.68, df = 1, p = 0.001). 
 
3.2.4. Comparing the two types of story with the false belief task  
As it is shown in Table 3, in total sample, 24 subjects passed the deceptive box task, 16 children were successful 
on at least one contrasting knowledge stories and 10 subjects provided correct answer on at least one contrasting-
bias stories. Therefore, children's performance on the deceptive- box task was significantly better than their 
performance on contrasting knowledge stories (Cochran's = 7.58, df = 1, p = 0.006). 
 
Table 3. Number of children providing correct answer by task type 
 
 Task type  
deceptive box Contrasting knowledge Contrasting bias 
24 16 10 
Note. Total sample consisted of 32 children. 
 
Also children provided significantly more correct answer on the deceptive box task than on contrasting biases 
stories (Cochran’s = 4.85, df = 1, p = 0.028). 
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3.3. Summary 
Results revealed that 6- year- old children were more successful than 4- year-old children on contrasting bias 
stories. Also these stories were more difficult than both tasks that were used for assessing recognition of false belief: 
the deceptive box task and contrasting knowledge stories. However, children's performance varied greatly across 
these two types of task that assessed the same concept. 
4. Conclusion 
In this study, preschoolers' understanding of biased social cognition was investigated and this understanding was 
compared with preschoolers' ability to recognize false belief. The results suggested that when contextual support 
was provided through the experimenter’s guidance, the 6-year-olds were able to understand the biased social 
cognition, but the 4-year-olds were not. In other words, in the high support condition, the 6-year-olds, but not the 4-
year-olds, could reason that prior belief (biases) influenced the observer’s interpretation of another individual’s 
behaviour. This finding was consistent with previous study (Pillow, 1991; Pillow & Weed, 1995). These earlier 
studies also reported that at about the ages of 6-8 years, children began to understand the biased social cognition.  
 Moreover, the results indicated that the understanding of biased social cognition was more difficult than the 
recognition of false belief. An explanation for this is that correct performance on the contrasting biased stories 
requires a higher level of ability that Amsell and Smally (2000) called it the ability to “reason counterfactually about 
possibilities." In each of these stories, to infer the perspectives of the observers, children first consider both positive 
and negative assumptions towards the actor (for example, in story 1, “Sarah is helpful and Sarah is mean”). Then, 
they interpret the actor’s ambiguous action in the light of these two opposite assumptions, and they imagine two 
opposite interpretations of the actor’s action (e.g., “Sarah is donating the doll or stealing it”). Finally, children 
compare and contrast these interpretations with regard to the observers’ biases. However, in false-belief tasks, they 
engage in a conditional reasoning. This reasoning requires cognitive effort to ignore a known fact (Riggs & 
Peterson, 2000). For example, in Story 3, children suppress the information that they know (the rabbit has jumped 
out of the cage) to simulate the knowledgebase of ignorant observer. This knowledgebase contains the information 
that Farzad (actor) holds the rabbit in front of its cage. Then, children derive an answer from this knowledgebase 
(Farzad holds the rabbit, therefore, he has taken the rabbit from the cage) and children attribute this answer (this 
belief) to the ignorant observer. Therefore, in false-belief tasks, successful performance needs less complex 
reasoning. 
On the other hand, the findings of the present study revealed that children's performance varied greatly across the 
two kinds of false-belief tasks. This variability was not consistent with the claim that children's theory of mind 
develops in two stages. As noted by Fischer and Biddle (2006) and Rose and Fischer (in press), the stage structure 
concept cannot predict and explain when and how such variability occurs. Therefore, based on this study we can 
merely claim that interpretational understanding of mind is more difficult than false belief understanding. However, 
in the conditions that provide contextual support for what Fischer and Yan (2002) called an optimal level of 
performance, 6- year-old children are able to relate to observer's prior belief and interpretation of other individual's 
action. Next, children gradually construct an explicit interpretive theory of mind by reflecting on their experiences in 
these conditions.  
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Appendix 
Stories Used in present study 
Story 1 (contrasting biases). Marjan likes Sarah. Marjan thinks Sarah is nice, and helpful, and always does good 
things. Nazanin does not like Sarah. Nazanin thinks Sarah is mean. Gets in trouble a lot and always does bad things. 
For Nowruz holiday, the teacher told the class about the poor children who wouldn't have any toys. The teacher 
asked the children in the class to give toys to the poor children. Then the teacher put a big box at the back of the 
classroom for them to put toys into for poor children. Some of children brought toys to school and put them in the 
box. One morning before School, Marjan and Nazanin saw Sarah holding a doll in front of the box. The box was 
open and its top was on the floor.  
Story 2 (contrasting biases). Behzad likes Babak. Behzad thinks Babak is nice, and helpful, and always does good 
things. Hamid does not like Babak. Hamid thinks Babak is mean, gets in trouble a lot, and always does, bad things. 
One day Behzad and Hamid were working on a puzzle together. The puzzle had a picture, of a giraffe on it, and they 
were trying to find the piece with the giraffe's head. Babak walked over and looked at what they were doing. Then 
Babak picked up the piece that Behzad and Hamid were trying to find. 
Story 3 (contrasting knowledge). Mehran and Shahab do not like Farzad. They both think Farzad is mean; gets-
into lots of trouble and always does bad things. One day the teacher brought a rabbit to school. The teacher told the 
children not to take the rabbit out of its cage. During recess all of the children went outside except Mehran and 
Farzad. Mehran and Farzad stayed inside. While they were alone in the classroom Mehran and Farzad saw the rabbit 
jump out of its cage. Farzad picked the rabbit up. Then Shahab came into the classroom and saw Farzad holding the 
-rabbit in front of the cage. Shahab did not see the rabbit jump out of the cage. 
Story 4 (contrasting knowledge). Negin and Bita both like Arezoo. Negin and Bita both think Arezoo is nice, and 
helpful, and always does good things. One day Negin and Bita were making chocolate chip cookies. To make the 
cookies they needed to mix up eggs, butter, and flour, and put in some chocolate chips. While Negin and Bita were 
mixing the eggs and the f1our, Arezoo walked up to the table and opened the bag of chocolate chips that they were 
going to put in the cookies. Bita saw Arezoo put some chocolate in her pocket. Negin did not see Arezoo put some 
Chocolate in her poket. Then Arezoo put the bag on the table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
